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We focus on the preferences of an extremely salient group of highly-experienced individuals 
who are entrusted with making decisions that affect the lives of millions of their citizens, heads 
of government. We test for the presence of a fundamental behavioral bias, loss aversion, in the 
way heads of government choose decision rules for international organizations. If loss aversion 
disappears with experience and high-stakes it should not exhibited in this context. Loss averse 
leaders choose decision rules that oversupply negative (blocking) power at the expense of 
positive power (to initiate affirmative action), causing welfare losses through harmful policy 
persistence and reform deadlocks. We find evidence of significant loss aversion (λ = 4:4) in the 
Qualified Majority rule in the Treaty of Lisbon, when understood as a Nash bargaining outcome. 
World leaders may be more loss averse than the populous they represent. 
JEL-Codes: D030, D810, D720, C780. 
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1 Introduction
Harking to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), people are more sensitive to perceived losses than
to commensurate gains (loss aversion). Loss aversion can explain an extraordinary variety of
otherwise puzzling phenomena: important examples are the equity premium puzzle (Benartzi
and Thaler, 1995), asymmetric price elasticities (Hardie et al., 1993), downward-sloping labor
supply (Dunn, 1996; Camerer et al., 1997; Goette et al., 2004), ineffi cient renegotiation
(Herweg and Schmidt, 2015), contract design (de Meza and Webb, 2007; Dittmann et al.,
2010; Herweg et al., 2010), taxpayer filing behavior (Engström et al., 2015; Rees-Jones,
2018), the play of game-show contestants (Post et al., 2008), the putting strategy of Tiger
Woods (Pope and Schweitzer, 2011) and the buying strategies of hog farmers (Pennings
and Smidts, 2003). Lakshminarayanan et al. (2006) experiment with monkeys and suggest
that loss aversion is a basic evolutionary trait that extends beyond humans. Reflecting this
evidence, Rabin (2000, p. 1288) calls loss aversion the “most firmly established feature of
risk preferences.”1
In this paper we focus on the preferences of a very small, but nonetheless extremely salient,
group of individuals who are entrusted with making decisions that affect the lives of millions
of their citizens: heads of government. In particular, we focus on the role of heads of
government in international decisionmaking. If indeed loss aversion is a basic evolutionary
trait then we should expect to observe it within heads of government. On the other hand,
heads of government are an unrepresentative sample of the human race. They are, for
instance, substantially more cognitively able than average (Dal Bó et al., 2017). Perhaps
unsurprisingly, therefore, there is growing evidence that these individuals (and other “elite”
decisionmakers) possess superior, or at least different, faculties of decisionmaking to a more
representative sample of the population and, in particular, to the undergraduate students
upon which most experimental estimates of loss aversion are based (e.g., Alevy et al., 2007;
Hafner-Burton et al., 2013).
If loss aversion goes away with experience and large-stakes, as supposed by some economists
(e.g., List, 2003, 2011; List and Mason, 2011; Levitt and List, 2008), then world leaders, who
1For other studies that take a more critical stance see, e.g., Plott and Zeiler (2005), who call into question
the general interpretation of gaps between the willingness to pay and the willingness to accept as evidence
for loss aversion. Gal and Rucker (2018) question other evidence traditionally interpreted as evidence of loss
aversion and argue that loss aversion appears to be best understood as a psychological phenomenon that is
dependent on contextual factors, rather than as a stable universal trait.
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make high-stakes decisions on a daily basis, should not be prone to loss aversion. Further-
more, political leaders also are known to have higher than average educational attainment
(e.g., Dal Bó et al., 2009; Dal Bó and Rossi, 2011), and education is frequently negatively
associated with the strength of loss aversion (Gächter et al., 2007; Booij and van de Kuilen,
2009; Hjorth and Fosgerau, 2011). Inesi (2010) reports experimental findings indicating that
powerful people exhibit less loss aversion.
If world leaders exhibit loss aversion this could affect their voting behavior in potentially
undesirable ways. In particular, heightened attention to potential losses might lead a head
of government to oppose an action that would, in expectation, be gainful to their citizens.
While important, we do not focus on voting behavior, but rather on the prior role that loss
aversion plays when heads of government choose the decision rule they subsequently use to
determine whether policies are implemented or not.
To investigate how loss averse, if at all, are world leaders we build on the idea that leaders
with differing degrees of loss aversion will prefer different decision rules. Participation in
international organizations forces a trade-off on world leaders: the need to coordinate on
cross-border issues versus the incumbent necessity to pool national sovereignty (Hooghe and
Marks, 2015). If, in particular, the national veto is conceded, a leader may experience a loss
if they are required to implement a motion that is harmful to their interests.
We therefore distinguish two distinct types of power within international institutions: the
power to initiate actions that an actor supports (positive power), and the power to prevent
actions that an actor opposes (negative power). From a purely objective, disinterested
viewpoint —i.e., in the absence of loss aversion —the positive and negative notions of power
seem of equal import. In the presence of loss aversion, however, heads of government are
induced to care more strongly about preventing bad outcomes (negative power) than about
initiating positive outcomes (positive power). Accordingly, when called to design voting
systems for international organizations, loss averse heads of government will choose decision
rules in which the hurdle to pass a motion is higher than to defeat it. Such decision rules
are biased towards maintenance of the status quo. Following studies that have observed a
preference for the status quo in, e.g., consumer and investment behavior (Samuelson and
Zeckhauser, 1988; Knetsch and Sinden, 1984; Hartman et al., 1991) we term this asymmetry
in favor of the status quo status quo bias.
Why does it matter if political leaders choose decision rules overly biased towards maintaining
2
the status quo? The dynamic costs of this effect are likely to be substantial. The harm from
status quo bias manifests in two interrelated phenomena (i) policy persistence, whereby
policies remain long after their purpose has been served (Coate and Morris, 1999), and; (ii)
reform deadlocks (e.g., Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Heinemann, 2004; Scharpf, 1988).2 To the
extent that loss aversion is pervasive in the electorate heads of government represent, society
may be willing to bear some of these harmful effects —indeed status quo bias is a ubiquitous
feature of the decision rules used in international organizations. But if heads of government
are more loss averse than their electorate, they may cause social harm by inducing these
effects at excessive levels. We shall present evidence that suggests heads of government may
indeed be more loss averse than the population at large.
In spite of the many normative approaches to the design of decision rules, in practice, in-
ternational organizations choose their decision rules as the outcome of a bargaining process
between heads of government.3 We, therefore, model the formation of decision rules as the
outcome of a Nash bargain between leaders, and show that the ratio of negative power to
positive power implied by the chosen rule is a suffi cient statistic for measuring loss aversion.
In this way, we seek to reveal the coeffi cient of loss aversion of world leaders from the adop-
tion of a new Qualified Majority (QM) decision rule for the European Union (EU) Council
of Ministers (CoM) in 2007. Precisely, we look for the level of loss aversion that leads to a
coincidence between the ratio of negative power to positive power implied in the observed
rule adopted by EU heads of government and the corresponding ratio at the Nash bargaining
solution (NBS).
The QM decision rule adopted by EU heads of government in 2007 is a majority rule for
decision-making in a subset of policy domains.4 It requires that, to pass, 55 percent of
member states must vote in favor of a motion, and those in favor must also represent at least
65 percent of EU citizens. Alternatively, a motion also passes if three or fewer countries
vote against it. To rationalize as a bargaining outcome the ratio of negative power to
positive power implied by this choice of decision rule requires a coeffi cient of loss aversion of
2Consistent with these points, use in the EU of a QM rule (rather than a unanimity rule) is associated
with speedier legislative responses, and thereby reduced such instances of persistence and deadlock. See,
e.g., Golub (2007) and König (2007).
3As such, the decision rules agreed through bargaining often depart from normative principles. See, e.g.,
Hosli and Machover (2004) for a (despairing) discussion of the Nice QM rule in this regard.
4The EU is by no means unique among international organizations in adopting a majority rule for making
at least a subset of decisions. For systematic analyses of the decision rules of international organizations see
Posner and Sykes (2014) and Blake and Payton (2015).
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λ = 4.4. This implies that losses loom approximately four and a half times as large as gains:
world leaders are loss averse. Consistent with our finding, Axel Moberg, a witness to the
earlier negotiation of the Nice QM rule as a member of the Swedish delegation, documents
how member states were largely preoccupied with “...the ability of groups of like-minded
states to block decisions” (Moberg, 2002: 261), i.e., a negative concept of power.5 Given
that estimates for λ generally cluster around two, leaders seem more loss averse than the
populations they represent. If leaders were loss neutral (λ = 1) a considerable number of
policy domains currently utilizing the unanimity rule in EU would instead be predicted to
utilize a majority rule.
Our model is intended as a descriptive, rather than normative, account of the process by
which decision rules are selected. As such, we follow a vast economic literature in interpreting
the (generalized) NBS as the outcome of a strategic bargaining process.6 The NBS, however,
also has desirable normative properties (Nash, 1950). In particular, the outcome of the
Nash bargain we consider yields an outcome that is Pareto effi cient in an ex-ante sense (i.e.,
from behind a veil of ignorance concerning the motion to be decided). This feature of the
model connects, therefore, with a literature that advocates ex-ante utility maximization as a
normative criterion for decision rule design (Barberà and Jackson, 2006; Maggi and Morelli,
2006; Rae, 1969).7
Our paper contributes to what is presently a relatively thin literature on elite decisionmak-
ing. As Hafner-Burton et al. (2013) explain, elites are diffi cult to study directly because
“...they are generally busy, wary of clinical poking, and skittish about revealing information
about their decisionmaking processes and particular choices.”By inferring preferences from
observed choices, we skirt these problems. We also provide a further exploration of the
role of behavioral economics in the nexus of economics and politics (see, e.g., Levy, 2003;
Boettcher, 2004; Baekgaard, 2017; Stein, 2017; Vis and Kuijpers, 2018). Our analysis also
5A further inside account of these negotiations that buttresses this point is Galloway (2001, Ch. 4).
6Binmore et al. (1986) show that the NBS is an approximation to the perfect equilibria in both time-
preference and exogenous-risk strategic models. These results are extended to non-expected utility prefer-
ences in Rubinstein et al. (1992). Harsanyi (1956) shows that the NBS coincides with the predictions of
some earlier strategic bargaining models, in particular that of Zeuthen (1930). This solution equivalence
between seemingly disjoint approaches explains, at least in part, the extensive use of the NBS in empirical
settings.
7For the further implementation of this normative criterion to decision rule design see, e.g., Beisbart et al.
(2005), Beisbart and Bovens (2007), and Laruelle and Valenciano (2010). Aghion et al. (2004) also consider
a normative approach to setting voting quotas, but from the perspective of optimally constraining political
leaders.
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connects to the wider formal analysis of the QM rule of the CoM (e.g., Felsenthal and Ma-
chover, 1997, 2001, 2004, 2009).8 As our findings suggest that the strength of loss aversion
exhibited by leaders may exceed that representative of the population at large, our find-
ings also have implications for the literature on the optimal selection of representatives in
delegated democracies (e.g., Harstad, 2010).
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 develops a theoretical framework for under-
standing positive and negative power under a given decision rule, and constructs a bargaining
model over the choice of a decision rule. Section 3 describes our implementation of the bar-
gaining model to the 2007 negotiation of the Lisbon QM rule, and Section 4 gives the results.
A discussion of our findings is given in Section 5. Proofs are located in Appendix 1, and the
figures appear at the very rear.
2 Model
In this section we model the adoption of a decision rule by an international organization
as the outcome of a grand bargain between its member states. We consider a voting body
N comprised of N > 1 member states, to which motions are submitted. The set of voting
possibilities is {for, against} and the outcome space is {pass, fail}.9 For a given motion, F
denotes the set (coalition) of members voting for.
Proceeding in the spirit of Laruelle and Valenciano (2010) we assume, for simplicity, that no
country is indifferent between voting for or against on any issue, and voting is not costly.
In these conditions, countries will vote for or against a motion according to whether the
motion is gainful or harmful to them, relative to the maintenance of the status quo. Before
the motion to be voted on is known, each country belongs to one of two possible types:
a for-country, which stands to gain a monetized amount W F > 0 if the motion passes,
or an against-country, which stands to lose a monetized amount WA > 0 if the motion
passes. Accordingly, a for-country, i, will vote for, hence i ∈ F . For an against-country j,
j /∈ F . If the motion fails, then the status quo position is maintained, so no country gains or
8Further notable contributions to this literature include Le Breton et al. (2012), Beisbart et al. (2005),
Leech (2002), Bindseil and Hantke (1997), Widgrén (1994), and Hosli (1993).
9We shall apply our model to the EU CoM, in which abstention is a third possible voting outcome. Under
the QM decision rule we study in this paper, however, abstention is formally indistinguishable from a vote
against. Hence, it can be omitted without any loss of generality.
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loses any amount. We assume that each country is of for-type with probability p ∈ (0, 1),
independently of the others, but countries only learn their type once the motion is known.
2.1 Decision Rules
Formally, a decision rule is a mapping, w, from the set F of countries voting for to the set
of voting outcomes that satisfies the following axioms:
Axiom 1 w (∅) 7→ fail.
Axiom 2 w (N ) 7→ pass.
Axiom 3 If w (F ) 7→ pass then w (T ) 7→ pass for any T satisfying F ⊆ T ⊆ N .
Axiom 4 If w (F ) 7→ pass then w (N \ F ) 7→ fail.
Axioms 1 and 2 together guarantee the existence of a non-empty coalition of countries that
can pass a motion when voting for. Axiom 3 is a monotonicity requirement. Decision
rules satisfying Axiom 4 are termed proper, and are otherwise termed improper. If the rule
is improper then multiple (and contradictory) outcomes are possible —making such rules
inherently unsuitable to making decisions of substance in international organizations. Hence
we restrict attention to proper rules.
The QM decision rule of the EU CoM, as enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 9c, is
a special case of a class of decision rules we denote by QM (qA, qF , qP ). Let the proportion
of the total population of countries i ∈ N belonging to country i be denoted by ρi, with
min {ρi}i∈N = ρ. A motion passes under the decision rule QM (qA, qF , qP ) when (i) either
at least a proportion qF ∈ (0.5, [N − 1] /N ] of members representing a proportion qP ∈
(0.5, 1 − ρ] or more of the total EU population votes for; or (ii) the number of members
voting against is less than qA ∈ {1, . . . , bN/2c}.
The decision rule chosen by EU leaders in the Treaty of Lisbon is the special case of
QM (qA, qF , qP ) given by QM (4, 0.55, 0.65). The set of winning coalitions under this rule is
depicted graphically as the light-shaded space in Figure 1. As is apparent in the Figure, a
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motion may pass under the Lisbon QM rule without the population threshold having been
satisfied if the size of the coalition voting against is less than four.10
Figure 1 —see p. 31
It is straightforward to observe that (i) QM (qA, qF , qP ) satisfies Axioms 1-4 and (ii) that
QM (qA, qF , qP ) is distinct from the unanimity rule, under which, for a motion to pass, all
countries must vote for.
2.2 Power: Positive and Negative
We now construct formal measures of power — both positive and negative — in a voting
body, extending earlier work in Coleman (1971). Positive power is the extent to which a
country i can initiate action. Hence, it is intimately related to the probability, conditional
on i having voted for, that a motion will pass, Pr (pass|i ∈ F ). Negative power —the power
to prevent action — is similarly related to the probability, conditional on i having voted
against, that a motion will fail, Pr (fail|i /∈ F ). A diffi culty with using these probabilities
as direct measures of power, however, is that they mix power with luck. In particular, if
the unconditional probability of a motion passing is denoted by Pr (pass) ≡ ω, then it is
only the differential Pr (pass|i ∈ F ) − ω that reflects genuine positive power separate from
luck. Similarly, pure negative power is reflected in the differential Pr (fail|i /∈ F )− [1− ω].
Rescaling these differentials linearly to the unit interval, we arrive at a pure measure of




Pr (pass|i ∈ F )− ω
1− ω ; β
−
i =
Pr (fail|i /∈ F )− [1− ω]
ω
. (1)
Under the twin assumptions that (i) all countries vote independently; and (ii) that each
country votes for and against with equal probability, β+i corresponds to Coleman’s (1971)
“power to initiate action”, β−i to Coleman’s “power to prevent action”, and ω to Coleman’s
“power of a collectivity to act” (“power to act”). We generalize the setting of Coleman
(1971), however, for although we retain assumption (i) above, we relax assumption (ii) by
10In the case of QM (4, 0.55, 0.65) it is apparent from Figure 1 that each of the three thresholds {qA, qF , qP }
actively shape the set of winning coalitions. More generally, however, one or more of the thresholds may
become redundant. For instance, if N − qA ≤ qF , then the threshold for members voting for, qF , plays no
role.
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allowing the probability of voting for to differ from that of voting against.11 Our measures
of positive and negative power are also closely related to the concept of criticality: country i
is critical (i ∈ C) when it is able to change the outcome of a vote by switching its vote. The
probability that a country is critical in a given vote, Pr(i ∈ C), is equivalently represented
as ω-weighted average of β+i and β
−
i ,
Pr(i ∈ C) = ωβ−i + [1− ω] β+i ,
or as the p-weighted harmonic mean of β+i and β
−
i :




+ [1− p] /β+i
}−1
.
The formal measures of positive and negative power permit an understanding of the con-
straints facing EU leaders when choosing a QM rule. Strengthening any one of the thresh-
olds {qA, qF , qP} reduces positive power by lowering the probability Pr (pass|i ∈ F ), but
increases negative power by raising the probability Pr (fail|i /∈ F ). As, however, strength-





is complex, and potentially non-monotonic. Importantly, however, heterogeneity







changes in the voting thresholds. This implies that, when countries differ in population,
they will have different preferences regarding the setting of these thresholds. Accordingly,
we shall represent the collective choice of {qA, qF , qP} by EU leaders as the outcome of an
underlying bargaining process.
2.3 Utility
Following prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992)
we suppose that countries form preferences over monetized gains and losses relative to the
status quo. In particular, we write utility as
U (W ) = V (W ) ; U (−W ) = −λV (W ) ; (2)
where V : R≥0 7→ R≥0 is everywhere increasing and possesses the “set point”property that
V (0) = 0. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose that preferences display loss aversion
11Although we know of no previous study to relax Coleman’s measures in this way, the related absolute
Banzhaf index (Banzhaf, 1968) has been relaxed similarly. Our generalization of Coleman’s measures cor-
responds to a special case of the way in which the absolute Banzhaf index is generalized in the “empirical
Banzhaf indices” of Heard and Swartz (1998) and the “behavioral power index” of Kaniovski and Leech
(2009).
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when −U (−W ) > U (W ) for all W > 0.12 In our framework this condition is equivalent to
the restriction λ > 1. Hence, λ is interpreted as a coeffi cient of loss aversion. A mass of
research into the coeffi cient of loss aversion is summarized in Booij et al. (2010: Table 1) and
Abdellaoui et al. (2007: Table 1), with estimates belonging to the range λ ∈ [1.07, 4.8] and
centering around λ = 2.13 Accordingly, the estimate λ = 2.25 of Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) is commonly employed in applications of prospect theory.
Using (2), the expected utility of country i, before the motion is known, writes as








+ Pr (fail)U (0) . (3)
To properly understand the role of positive and negative power in generating expected utility
we rewrite (3) in a more informative manner:
Proposition 1 The expected utility of country i, before the motion is known, is given by
E (Ui) = p
{















Proposition 1 relates the expected utility of country i to its positive power, β+i , and its
negative power β−i in an intuitive way. Possession of positive power increases expected














< 0 is incurred. To see how loss aversion interacts with positive and











We stress in interpreting (4) that heads of government can, in actuality, only choose the






12This definition of loss aversion is the original one of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and may be
interpreted as applying to “large stakes”. A related definition of loss aversion for “small stakes” is
given by Köbberling and Wakker (2005), according to which U (·) displays loss aversion if and only if
limW↑0 ∂U(W )/∂W > limW↓0 ∂U(W )/∂W . As designing decision rules for international organizations is
inherently a large stakes context, we do not dwell on the small stakes case. We note, however, that these
two definitions of loss aversion are complementary, and both are commonly assumed together in axiomatic
models (see, e.g., Bowman et al., 1999; Kőszegi and Rabin, 2007). For other related discussions of concepts
of loss aversion see Wakker and Tversky (1993), Schmidt and Zank (2005) and Zank (2010).
13A notable later study, Tanaka et al. (2010), reports an average estimated value of λ of 2.63, consistent
with much of the earlier evidence.
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simultaneously in an analytically complex way. This caveat notwithstanding, the thought-
experiment of separately increasing β−i and β
+
i for a fixed ω is instructive. Importantly, λ
interacts positively negative power, but not with positive power. It follows that, as λ is
increased, negative power becomes relatively more potent as a means to increase expected
utility relative to positive power.
2.4 Bargaining over Decision Rules
The Lisbon QM rule, QM (4, 0.55, 0.65), was adopted as the consensual outcome of nego-
tiations among all EU leaders. The consensual nature of the outcome not withstanding,
the negotiations were intense in nature, with countries robustly defending their interests.
Accordingly, we model the outcome of these negotiations as the solution of a (generalized)
Nash bargain among EU member states.
The formulation of a general bargaining problem over the set of all decision rules satisfying
A0-A3 is analytically intractable. Instead, we exploit the observation in Cameron’s (2004)
account of the preparatory negotiations that countries first agreed on the “double-majority”
scheme inherent in the Lisbon rule, before then proceeding to negotiate over the setting of
the thresholds. We therefore focus on the second stage bargain over the three threshold
quantities {qA, qF , qP} defined within the QM rule.14
What would have been the outcome if EU leaders had been unable to agree on a QM rule?
Here we suppose that, in the absence of an agreement, EU leaders resort to the unanimity
decision rule, under which a motion passes if and only if all countries vote for. Although the
unanimity rule is typically Pareto dominated by majority decision rules (see, e.g., Bouton et
al., 2017, 2018) it is focal as the disagreement outcome as it is already used in the EU for
decisionmaking in some domains. Also, uniquely among decision rules, the unanimity rule
ensures that no country can ever experience a loss: collective action is taken only if it is a
Pareto improvement over the status quo (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962).
If the unanimity decision rule is adopted, each country obtains a (common) expected utility





14For a theoretical contribution in which complex decision rules with multiple thresholds emerge as an
equilibrium outcome, see Harstad (2005).
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where equation (5) follows from the observation that only in the event that all countries
vote for, which occurs with probability pN , is an affi rmative outcome reached. In all other
instances, the motion fails and the status quo is preserved.
While the unanimity rule maximizes negative power (giving full insurance against the adop-
tion of harmful motions), it comes at the cost of minimizing positive power. A head of
government who is suffi ciently loss averse will be willing to make this sacrifice, but a less
loss averse leader will not. Comparing (3) and (5), country i prefers the unanimity rule to










] V (W F )
V (WA)
≡ λ̃i (qA, qF , qP ) . (6)
Let λi ≡ max{qA,qF ,qP } λ̃i (qA, qF , qP ) be the maximum value of λ̃i (qA, qF , qP ), such that if
λ > λi there is no choice of thresholds {qA, qF , qP} that would make country i prefer a QM




as the smallest such λi across countries, we then have:
Proposition 2





[E (Uj)− E (UD)]τ j ;
∑
j∈N
τ j = 1; (7)
where τ j > 0 is the bargaining weight of country j.
(ii) If λ ≥ λ the bargaining outcome is the unanimity rule (disagreement outcome).
Proposition 2 establishes the predicted bargaining outcomes. If λ < λ there exists a decision
rule QM (qA, qF , qP ) that yields a Pareto improvement relative to the disagreement outcome,
in which case countries are predicted to bargain to the NBS. Conversely, if λ ≥ λ then, for
every set of thresholds {qA, qF , qP} there exists at least one country that is better-off under
the unanimity rule than under QM (qA, qF , qP ). In this case, any such country will force
implementation of the unanimity rule.
3 Estimation
In this section we use the model of the previous section to analyze the choice by EU leaders
of the QM rule contained in the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, and which entered into force on 1st
November 2014.
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3.1 Identification of λ
To motivate our approach to measuring the coeffi cient of loss aversion, we now prove a
Lemma:
Lemma 1 The ratio β−i /β
+
i is independent of i.
Lemma 1 establishes that the ratioR ≡ β−i /β+i is common across countries. Thus, R captures
in a single statistic the collective preference of EU leaders for negative relative to positive
power. Formally, let R (λ) be the value of R at the NBS for a given λ. As higher values of
λ increase the marginal utility associated with negative power, but not with positive power,
R (λ) is a monotone increasing function. Via this link from λ to R, we are able to infer the
value of λ held by EU leaders from the observed R implied by their choice of decision rule.
We look for the unique value of λ (denoted λ∗) at which R (λ) corresponds to the observed
R of the Lisbon QM rule chosen by EU leaders (RLisbon):
R (λ∗) = RLisbon.
3.2 Implementation
Bargaining weights
The outcome of a bargaining process may be affected by a range of factors in addition to
those captured by the decision rule. As Bailer (2010) discusses in the EU context, a range of
other factors, including bargaining skill, economic might, domestic constraints, information,
and institutional power, plausibly play a role. Our model allows for these features to be
captured within the set of bargaining weights, {τ j}j∈N . We now describe how we infer these
weights from the observed choice behavior of EU leaders:
Lemma 2 At the NBS define by (7) it holds that
τ i ≈
E (Uj)− E (UD)∑
j∈N [E (Uj)− E (UD)]
.
Lemma 2 states that the bargaining weight of a member corresponds to their share of the
surplus at the NBS. The proof of Lemma 2 demonstrates that, were all the variables in the
bargaining problem in (7) defined on the set of real numbers, the approximation given in
the Lemma would hold exactly. The approximation in the Lemma arises, therefore, as the
12
measures of positive and negative power can take values on only the rational numbers. In our
context, however, the approximation is extremely close —the maximum relative deviation
across i ∈ N is a mere 0.083 percent. Accordingly, precise estimates of the bargaining
weights that applied in the Lisbon negotiations can be inferred from the set of expected
surpluses {E (Uj)− E (UD)}j∈N arising under the Lisbon QM rule actually chosen by EU
leaders. As, however, Proposition 1 makes clear that expected utility is a function of λ, the
inferred surpluses depend on the assumed level of loss aversion. Hence, at every value of λ,
we compute an estimate of each τ i, denoted τ̂ i, as
τ̂ i (λ) =
ELisbon (Ui (λ))− E (UD)∑
j∈N [ELisbon (Uj (λ))− E (UD)]
.
Voting probabilities
From behind a veil of ignorance as to the motion to be voted on and the preferences of the
voters, it is assumed frequently that a voter is equally likely to vote for or against (p = 0.5).
In this context, however, we believe there are a-priori grounds to suppose that, under the
QM rule, countries are more likely to support a motion than to oppose it (p > 0.5). The
argument here is one of selection: as well as choosing a QM rule EU leaders also choose the
policy areas to which it will apply. In particular, it is an established practice within the EU
that, in some policy areas, the CoM votes under the unanimity rule.15 Consistent with this
observation, for a fixed λ Proposition 2 implies that a QM rule is applied in those areas with
a suffi ciently high a-priori expectation of consensus (i.e., p high enough that λ < λ (p)), while
the unanimity rule (disagreement outcome) is chosen for policy areas expected to achieve
suffi ciently little consensus (i.e., p low enough that λ ≥ λ (p)).
EU voting records indeed show very high levels of consensus in voting under a QM rule. Using
data provided by VoteWatch Europe (http://www.votewatch.eu), an independent not-for-
profit organization, we examine voting outcomes under the QM rule that applied at the time
EU leaders were negotiating the Lisbon Treaty. This was the QM rule in the Treaty of Nice
that applied between February 2003 and October 2014.16 For the motions covered by the
15Policy areas currently subject to the unanimity rule include common foreign and security policy, EU
membership, the granting of new rights to EU citizens, and the harmonization of national legislation in the
field of social security and social protection.
16The QM rule in the Nice Treaty entails three thresholds for motions to pass. It requires that 74 percent
of member states’weighted votes be cast in favor, and a majority of member states to vote in favor. Last,
those in favor are required to represent at least 62 percent of the EU’s total population.
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data —all 600 voted on by the CoM under the Nice QM rule beyond 7th July 2009 —the
proportion of votes cast that were votes for stands at 97.29 percent.17 Hosli (2007) reports
a similarly high rate of 97.96 percent in data on CoM votes covering 1995-2004, and (our)
initial estimates under the Lisbon QM rule (based on VoteWatch data between 1st November
2014 and 27th April 2018) put the proportion of for votes at 97.80 percent.18
We use the observed rates of voting for under the Nice QM rule to estimate the parameter p,
which is the a-priori probability that a motion is gainful to a country. Here we suppose that
EU leader’s beliefs concerning the future value of p (under the QM rule they were seeking to
negotiate) reflect the empirical frequency of for-voting observed under the QM rule at the
time the negotiations were taking place.19 A naïve approach to the estimation of p is to equate
it directly to the observed proportion of for-votes. A notable feature of our data that augurs
against such an approach, however, is that no vote in the CoM is observed to fail under the
QM rule (Nice or Lisbon). This appears indicative of a tendency within the EU Commission
(and other international bodies) to bring forward only proposals that are expected to pass
under the relevant decision rule. By contrast, our model envisages an environment in which
motions are not filtered endogenously in the shadow of the decision rule. Accordingly, to
align the model with actual practice in the EU, we interpret the empirical proportion of
votes that are for as an estimate of the conditional probability Pr (i ∈ F |pass) rather than
of the unconditional probability Pr (i ∈ F ). Under the Nice QM rule some 97.29 percent of
votes are for votes. We use this statistic to back-out the implied value of p ≡ Pr (i ∈ F ).
In particular, p is the solution to the equality
p
1− ωNice (p)
= Pr (i ∈ F |pass) = 0.9729. (8)
We compute the solution to the equality in (8) as p = 0.97287. We use this estimate in what
follows.
17In practice the CoM will sometimes (6.3 percent of motions) vote more than once on a motion. The
majority (99 percent) of the uses of the QM rule in our data occur under the ordinary legislative procedure
(previously co-decision) under which the European Parliament may propose amendments to legislation passed
by the CoM at first reading, thereby requiring further rounds of voting in the CoM. Where multiple rounds
of voting occur we restrict attention to the final round of voting, for in earlier rounds of voting the vote was
over legislation not in its final form. We also exclude a small number of motions (55) on which not all CoM
members participated in voting (e.g. acts adopted only by Euro area or Schengen member states).
18For further discussion of voting patterns in the CoM see Hosli et al. (2018).
19Implicitly, therefore, we assume that EU leaders expected that rates of for-voting would remain un-
changed (relative to under the Nice QM rule) under the new Lisbon QM rule they were in the business of
negotiating. As empirical rates of for-voting in the CoM have indeed been virtually identical under the Nice
and Lisbon QM rules, such an expectation was rational.
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Monetary payoffs
From behind a veil of ignorance as to the motion to be decided, the monetary payoffs are
set equal, W F = WA = W , so that the loss from implementing an unfavorable motion is
equivalent in magnitude to the gain from implementing a favorable motion. This is not
to deny the existence of payoff variability across motions, but rather harks to Bernoulli’s
principle of insuffi cient reason, according to which, in the absence of a compelling a-priori
reason for assigning different values, equality should be presumed.
A notable implication of this specification is that the sub-utility function, V (W ), enters both
the expected utility in Proposition 1, and the disagreement payoff in (5), as a multiplicative
factor. It therefore enters the Nash product as a multiplicative factor, and consequently
plays no role in the determination of the NBS. Our estimate of the coeffi cient of loss aversion
is, therefore, independent of assumed risk preferences.
Computational approach
We solve the problem in (7) using numerical methods. For a given choice of λ we perform
initially a grid search over 11 × 13 × 13 unique points in {qA, qF , qP}-space, from which a
set of potential local maxima are identified.20 To locate each local maximum exactly, and
ultimately infer which of these local maxima is the global maximum, we employ a direct
search (compass) algorithm around each potential local maximum (see Kolda et al., 2003,
for a review of these methods).21
Proceeding in this way, to obtain R (λ) for a given λ we must compute R (qA, qF , qP ) over
8000 times. Moreover, the results we present in the next section are based on computing
R (λ) for some 223 unique values of λ. For this approach to be feasible, therefore, standard






cannot be employed: a single brute-force
computation of either β−i or β
+
i for the then 27-member CoM requires checking the outcome
of some 227 possible vote configurations.22 Accordingly, we develop a novel approach to this
computational problem (Appendix 2).23
20The grid search computes the Nash product in (7) for qA ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 13}, qF ∈ {14, 15, . . . 27}, and
qP ∈ {0.5, 0.55, . . . , 1}.
21We employ the method in Lewis et al. (2007) when searching close to one or more parameter boundaries.
22Croatia, currently the newest member of the now 28-state EU, did not join until July 2013.
23The scale of the population data thwarts the effi ciency of generating functions (see Bilbao et al., 2000) as
an alternative exact approach. Although we do not dwell on this methodological development here, we note
that the approach to the computation of {β−i , β
+
i } outlined in Appendix 2 has applicability to the study of
a range of other large-N voting games for which existing approaches are ineffi cient.
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4 Results
Our findings for the coeffi cient of loss aversion are depicted in Figure 2. Panel (a) of the
figure shows the function R (λ) for λ on a broad domain encompassing all points such that
λ ≤ λ. Panel (b) of the Figure “zooms in”on R (λ) around the point λ = λ∗. In panel (a)
we see that R (λ) increases in λ in a largely stepped fashion. The critical value λ is found
as λ = 25.9, at which point Malta (the least populous EU member) is suffi ciently loss averse
that it prefers the unanimity rule to any QM rule. Accordingly, for λ ≥ λ the unanimity
rule applies.
Figure 2 —see p. 32
To obtain an estimate of λ we look for the intersection of R (λ) with RLisbon, where the latter
computes as RLisbon = 0.0045. As seen in panel (b), the intersection arises at λ = λ
∗ = 4.40.
This finding implies that the potential for losses arising from the passing of a motion are
given around 4.4 times as much psychological weight as are the potential for gains. EU
leaders are loss averse. Moreover, given that evidence on loss aversion in the population at
large places λ at around two, it appears EU leaders may actually be more loss averse than
their average citizen.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this study we used the way in which world leaders choose voting systems for international
institutions to infer their coeffi cient of loss aversion. In particular, we consider the design
of the QM rule in the Treaty of Lisbon, which was negotiated by EU leaders in 2007. Our
approach models the negotiations over the Lisbon rule as a (Nash) bargain, and estimates
the coeffi cient of loss aversion independently of risk preferences. Given that EU leaders
ringfenced the use of their QM rule to policy domains known a-priori to have high levels
of agreement between members, the thresholds chosen for motions to pass suggests a very
strong concern for blocking power.24 Accordingly, our findings suggest that world leaders are
24Moreover, EU member states, as well as ringfencing use of the QM rule, also have access to a number
of constitutional arrangements —notably the “Luxembourg Veto”and “Ioannina Compromise”—that aim
to provide safeguards to countries who face being outvoted under the QM rule (see, e.g., Reestman and
Beukers, 2017). Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides for member states to leave the EU, can also
be viewed as an ultimate form of insurance against realizing a loss (Huysmans, 2018).
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heavily loss averse: the potential for losses are given around 4.4 times as much psychological
weight as is the potential for equivalent gains.
Designing decision rules for international organizations inherently entails high-stakes, and
heads of government are highly experienced decisionmakers. These features might suggest
that heads of government would not exhibit loss aversion. Our findings go contrary this
suggestion, however. Indeed, to the extent that our estimate of the coeffi cient of loss aversion
is higher than is typically found in the literature, heads of government may be more prone
to loss aversion than is the population at large. Our findings are instead consistent with
the literature arguing that even experts remain prone to behavioral biases (Foellmi et al.,
2016; Pope and Schweitzer, 2011). Professional golfers, for instance, are significantly less
accurate with birdie putts than when they attempt otherwise similar putts for par. It is also
possible, however, that heads of government might be more prone than usual to loss aversion
in the pressure-cooker atmosphere surrounding the negotiation of an international decision
rule. There is evidence that even experienced decisionmakers may “choke”when faced with
making highly consequential decisions, and thereby exhibit greater behavioral bias than they
would over more routine decisions with lower stakes (Baumeister, 1984; Ariely et al., 2009;
Dohmen, 2008).
Loss aversion leads to the design of decision rules that set the bar for affi rmative action
ineffi ciently high. Welfare improving policies that would be enacted in a counterfactual
world without loss aversion (i.e., loss neutrality) may not be enacted in a world with loss
aversion. In the EU context two distinct effects are discernible, which align conceptually
with the notions of intensive and extensive margins. First, at the intensive margin, our
analysis predicts that, if EU heads of government were loss neutral, they would have designed
a QM rule with less stringent thresholds for motions to pass. Second, at the extensive
margin, under loss neutrality, EU heads of government would have been willing to utilize
the QM rule for decisionmaking over range of policy issues that are at present subject to
the unanimity rule. Taking these effects in turn, under the conditions of our stylized model,
0.023 percent of motions are predicted to fail under the Lisbon QM rule. Were EU leaders
loss neutral the predicted fail rate falls to less than 0.0001 percent under the QM rule they
would hypothetically choose. While this difference is significant in relative terms, in absolute
terms the effect is small. This is simply because QM is only utilized in domains with very
high rates of consensus, so there is limited scope to further reduce already tiny predicted
failure rates.
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The second (extensive) effect is plausibly much larger. To see this we reinterpret Proposition
2. Proposition 2 is predicated on the existence of a known p, and proceeds to characterize
the nature of the bargaining outcome as a function of λ. It is equally possible, however,
to fix λ (at λ = λ∗ = 4.4) and then characterize the bargaining outcome as a function of
p. This leads to a threshold level of p, p (λ∗) ∈ (0, 1), such that for policy domains with
p ≤ p (λ∗) the unanimity rule is adopted, and a QM rule is adopted otherwise. Intuitively,
a lower value of p implies an increased probability that a country will face motions that, if
passed, would cause it harm. This increases the attractiveness of the unanimity rule relative
to all other decision rules. For a suffi ciently low p, i.e., p ≤ p (λ∗), there exists no QM rule
that is a Pareto improvement relative to the disagreement outcome.
We compare p (λ∗) with p (1) — the latter being the threshold p that applies under loss
neutrality. Using the computational approach described in section 3.2 we obtain p (1) = 0.5
and p (λ∗) = 0.82. Accordingly, under loss aversion, policy areas with p ∈ (0.82, 1) are
predicted to utilize a QM rule, and policy areas with p ≤ 0.82 are predicted to use the
unanimity rule. Under loss neutrality, the model predicts that policy areas with p ∈ (0.5, 1)
would utilize a QM rule, and policy areas with p ≤ 0.5 would use the unanimity rule. It
follows that policy areas for which 0.5 < p < 0.82 are those in which loss averse EU leaders
are predicted to choose the unanimity rule, whereas loss neutral EU leaders are predicted
to choose a QM rule. Thus, the interval for p on which a QM rule is predicted to be used
almost triples (178 percent increase) in size under loss neutrality. Thus, many domains which
presently use the unanimity rule might be predicted to use a QM rule in a loss neutral world,
with potentially profound implications for European cooperation in areas such as taxation,
social security or social protection, foreign and common defence policy and operational police
cooperation.
Of course, when EU leaders arrived to negotiate and sign the final agreement, much prepara-
tory work had already been performed by their offi cials. Thus, one may ask whether the
Lisbon bargaining outcome reflects the preferences of world leaders or the preferences of their
offi cials. After all, offi cials will sometimes (i) possess greater expertise; (ii) have powers of
agenda setting; (iii) influence the flow of information to political decisionmakers; and (iv)
affect decisionmaking through their choice of framing (see, e.g., Blom-Hansen et al., 2017
and the references therein). Although the adverse consequences of loss aversion in the choice
of decision rules apply irrespective of whether such loss aversion resides with the appointed
bureaucrats or the heads of government, we suspect that in the high-stakes case we consider,
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in which their personal political reputation was on the line, the EU heads of government
themselves played a pivotal role, and had the final say. Moreover, heads of government have
ultimate control over the selection of the offi cials to whom they delegate responsibilities. In
personal correspondence, Axel Moberg, a witness to the earlier Nice QM rule negotiations,
describes how “high-ranking offi cials were often indisposed to enter into discussion of the
merits of various proposals since this was a matter for “higher up”.”
From a broader perspective, given that decision rules are not only a feature of EU deci-
sionmaking, but are pervasive in other international, national and local contexts, the wider
public policy implications of our analysis are potentially very significant. In an effort to pre-
vent behavioral biases distorting the design of such decision rules we echo the call of Hosli
and Machover (2004) for a dialogue between academics and practitioners in order to allow
for more informed choices.
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Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1. Using (2) in (3) gives









By the multiplication axiom of conditional probabilities, we then have

















Substituting Pr (i ∈ F ) = p, this reduces to









Finally, using (1) to replace the terms Pr (pass|i ∈ F ) and Pr (fail|i /∈ F ), we obtain the
proposition.
Proof of Lemma 1. Define
βi = ωβ
−
i + [1− ω] β+i . (A.1)
According to (A.1), βi is constructed as the sum of (i) the probability a country can turn
an otherwise winning coalition into a losing one by switching its vote from for to against
(ωβ−i ); and (ii) the probability that a country can turn an otherwise losing coalition into a
winning one by switching its vote from against to for ([1− ω] β+i ). When country i is able
to change to outcome of a vote by switching its vote, it is said to be critical (i ∈ C). Thus
βi is simply the probability that i is critical: βi = Pr(i ∈ C).
We now construct expressions for Pr (pass|i ∈ F ) and Pr (fail|i /∈ F ). By Bayes’rule we
have
Pr (pass|i ∈ F ) = Pr (pass) Pr(i ∈ F |pass)
Pr (i ∈ F ) =
ω Pr(i ∈ F |pass)
p
; (A.2)
Pr (fail|i /∈ F ) = Pr (fail) Pr(i /∈ F |fail)
Pr (i /∈ F ) =
[1− ω] Pr(i /∈ F |fail)
1− p . (A.3)
Then, again by Bayes’rule,
Pr(i ∈ F |pass) = Pr (i ∈ (C ∩ F ) ∩ pass) + Pr (i ∈ (F \ C) ∩ pass)
Pr (pass)
. (A.4)
Noting that Pr (i ∈ (C ∩ F ) ∩ pass) = Pr (i ∈ C ∩ F ), and that i ∈ C and i ∈ F are statis-
tically independent events, (A.4) reduces to
Pr(i ∈ F |pass) = Pr(i ∈ F ) [Pr (i ∈ C) + Pr (i /∈ C ∩ pass)]
Pr (pass)
=





Using analogous steps we also obtain
Pr(i /∈ F |fail) = [1− p] [βi + Pr (i /∈ C ∩ fail)]
1− ω . (A.6)
Substituting (A.5) into (A.2) and (A.6) into (A.3) we obtain
Pr (pass|i ∈ F ) = ω Pr(i ∈ F |pass)
p
= βi + Pr (i /∈ C ∩ pass) ; (A.7)
Pr (fail|i /∈ F ) = [1− ω] Pr(i /∈ F |fail)
1− p = βi + Pr (i /∈ C ∩ fail) . (A.8)
By definition, we have
Pr (pass) ≡ Pr (i /∈ C ∩ pass) + Pr (i ∈ (C ∩ F ) ∩ pass) + Pr (i ∈ (C \ F ) ∩ pass)
= Pr (i /∈ C ∩ pass) + Pr (i ∈ C ∩ F )
= Pr (i /∈ C ∩ pass) + Pr (i ∈ F ) Pr (i ∈ C) . (A.9)
So, rearranging (A.9),
Pr (i /∈ C ∩ pass) = Pr (pass)− pβi = ω − pβi. (A.10)
By analogous steps we obtain
Pr (i /∈ C ∩ fail) = Pr (fail)− [1− p] βi = 1− ω − [1− p] βi. (A.11)
Substituting (A.10) into (A.7) and (A.11) into (A.8) we obtain
Pr (pass|i ∈ F ) = βi + Pr (i /∈ C ∩ pass) = ω + [1− p] βi; (A.12)
Pr (fail|i /∈ F ) = βi + Pr (i /∈ C ∩ fail) = 1− ω + pβi. (A.13)













such that positive and negative power, β+i and β
−
i , are seen to be directly proportional to



















which does not depend on i.
Proof of Lemma 2. We begin by assuming (falsely), that the variables in the bargaining
problem are all defined on the set of real numbers (such that we can always increment and
decrement at the margin). At a Nash bargaining solution, a marginal increase in E (Ui)
and an offsetting decrease in E (Uj), j 6= i, must leave the value of the Nash maximand





= 0; j 6= i. (A.15)
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The N − 1 equations given by setting i = 1 and j = 2, . . . , N in (A.15), coupled with the
equality
∑
k∈N τ k = 1, together give a system of N equations in N unknowns, {τ k}k∈N , with





Thus, for real variables, at a Nash bargaining solution, the weight τ i corresponds to i’s share




are not defined on the real line, but instead
are restricted to a subset of the rational numbers, the equality in (A.16) does not hold exactly









dense: at the estimate of λ = 4.4 the maximum relative deviation from (A.16) is only 0.083
percent.
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Appendix 2: Computing Positive and Negative Power







for the Lisbon QM rule. Whereas the brute force approach to the computation of these
measures is of order 2N complexity, our approach reduces this to a complexity of order
2N/2. The method computes exact (machine precision) values with a large proportion of







which therefore requires us to compute the set of measures {βi}i∈N , where βi is the a-priori
probability that country i is critical. The crux of the problem is to count (in a weighted
fashion) how often a given country is critical, the most diffi cult part of which is determining
whether or not PF lies in a specified range.
Let {ρi}i∈N denote the set of population proportions, and ρ̃ denote its median. Let PF =∑
i∈F ρi denote the population share of the members of F . We then bifurcate N into two
subsets: N− = {i : ρi 6 ρ̃}i∈N and N+ = {i : ρi > ρ̃}i∈N . That is, N− is the least populous
half of EU member states andN+ the most populous. For a given setM⊆ N and P ∈ [0, 1],
define
Sk (P,M) ≡ {F : F ⊆M, |F | = k, PF 6 P} .
Note that each element of Sk (P,M) is equally likely; each occurs with probability pk (1− p)|M|−k.
Now let
s (k, P,M) ≡
∣∣Sk (P,M)∣∣ pk (1− p)|M|−k ; (A.17)
t (k, P,M) ≡
∑
j>k
s (j, P,M) . (A.18)
The function s in (A.17) gives the probability that a coalition ofM with k members voting
for and the sum of the population proportions of those k members being no more than P .
The function t in (A.18) gives the same probability as s, but for a coalition ofM where k
or more members vote for. As s and t do not depend on QM(qF , qP , qA) one can, in practice,
compute (for each i ∈ N ) the set {s (k, P,M) , t (k, P,M)}k∈[0,|M|],P∈{PF : F⊆M},M∈{N−\{i},N+\{i}}
once at the outset. These data are then used in the remainder of the approach.
A member i ∈ N is critical for a given F ∈ N \ {i} if and only if any one of the following
four conditions holds:
1. qP − ρi 6 PF < qP AND NF > qF − 1 AND NF 6 N − qA;
2. qP 6 PF AND NF = qF − 1 AND NF 6 N − qA;
3. NF < qF − 1 AND NF = N − qA;
4. PF < qP − ρi AND NF > qF − 1 AND NF = N − qA.
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We use s and t to determine the probability weight of coalitions in which a given member is
critical under each condition. First, for brevity, define
N#i ≡ N# \ {i};
s#i (k, P ) ≡ s
(
k, P,N# \ {i}
)
;
t#i (k, P ) ≡ t
(
k, P,N# \ {i}
)
;
where # ∈ {−,+}. We then compute the probability that member i is critical under




πij (F ) ;
where
πi1 (F ) = t
−
i (qF − |F |, qP − PF − ρi)− t−i (N − qA + 1− |F |, qP − PF − ρi)
−
{
t−i (qF − |F |, qP − PF )− t−i (N − qA + 1− |F |, qP − PF )
}
;
πi2 (F ) = s
−
i (qF − 1− |F |, 1)− lim
ε↓0
s−i (qF − 1− |F |, qP − ε− PF );
πi3 (F ) = s
−
i (N − qA − |F |, 1);
πi4 (F ) = s
−
i (N − qA − |F |, qP − ρi − PF ).


















Figure 1: Visual representation of the set of winning coalitions under the Lisbon QM decision
rule. The heavy-shaded region is infeasible. The light-shaded region is the set of
winning coalitions.
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(a) R at the bargaining outcome, as a function of λ.





(b) R at the bargaining outcome in the neighborhood of λ = λ∗.
some texttttttttFigure 2: The bargaining outcome for different values of λ.
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